In the paper, the EPR paradox is explored by the approach of quantum supervaluationism that leads to a "gappy" semantics with the propositions giving rise to truth-value gaps. Within this approach, the statement, which asserts that in the singlet state the system of two (i.e., A and B) spin-1 2 particles possesses the a priori property "spin A is up and spin B is down along the same axis" or "spin A is down and spin B is up along the same axis", does not have the truthvalue at all. Consequently, after the verification of, say, the proposition "spin A is up along the z-axis", the statistical population describing the valuation of the logical connective "spin B is down along the z-axis and spin B is up (down) along the x-axis" would have no elements.
Introduction
Let |s, m j denote the vector of the Hilbert space describing the state of particle's spin, where s stands for the spin quantum number and m j specifies the spin projection quantum number along the j ∈ {x, y, z} axis. Consider a system with two (A and B) spin- 
Suppose that after being prepared in the singlet, these particles travel away from each other in a region of zero magnetic field where by means of a Stern-Gerlach magnet an observer "Alice" measures the spin of the particle A and by means of another Stern-Gerlach magnet an observer "Bob" measures the spin of the particle B. Assume that the measurements are space-like separated, such that neither of the observers can act upon or exercise influence on the result of the other.
Let ↑ j denote the proposition asserting that the spin-1 2 particle exists in the spin state "j-up" (i.e., the statement "m j = + 1 2 ") whereas ↓ j signify the alternative proposition that this particle is in the spin state "j-down" (i.e., the statement "m j = − 1 2 ").
Let the double-bracket notation [[ ⋄ ]]
v where the symbol ⋄ stands for any proposition (compound or simple) denote a valuation in a circumstance v, that is, a mapping from a set of propositions {⋄} to a set of truth-values V N = {v} having the cardinality N and the range with the upper bound 1 (which represents the truth) and the lower bound 0 (representing the falsehood), relative to a particular circumstance of evaluation indicated by v.
Let us consider the propositions Same j and Diff j :
where ∨ stands for "exclusive or " logical connective. The proposition Same j asserts that the two particles have the same directions of their spins along the j-axis, while the proposition Diff j declares that their spin directions are different along j.
Because the system is prepared in the singlet state, Alice and Bob can affirm that prior to the verification the proposition Same j has the value of falsehood at the same time as the proposition Diff j has the value of truth, i.e., [
Suppose that using the outcome of the measurement, Alice proves (disproves) the statement "m ". This act destroys information about the projection of the spin of the particle A along any other axis k ∈ {x, y, z} not equal to j (that might previously have been obtained) and, for that reason, one can write
where the symbol must be replaced by either ↑ or ↓.
However, if both of the following premises are assumed, namely, 
or, explicitly,
Hence, the verification of
j ]] v } = {0, 1} without destroying information about the spin projection of the particle B along any axis k = j.
Let us consider, for example, the product [[ ↓
x ]] v . Its statistical population is the "cross product" of the sets
x ]] v } and defined such that
Following the verification of the proposition ↑
z , the said statistical population will contain two pairs -each for every possible preexisitng truth-value of ↑ (B)
x , namely,
In consequence, the verification (refutation) of ↑
carried out in another experimental run will bring the definiteness to this product. This way, the statement "m As it can be readily seen, to resolve this paradox (known as the EPR paradox [1] ) upon the supposition that the particle B cannot be affected by measurements carried out on the particle A, one can deny either the premise (1) or the premise (2). This paper presents a logic approach to the EPR paradox where the premise (1) is denied.
Quantum supervaluationism
Consider the lattice L(H) formed by the column spaces (ranges) of the projection operatorsP α , P β , . . . on the Hilbert space H.
In the lattice L(H) the ordering relation ≤ corresponds to the subset relation ran(P α ) ⊆ ran(P β ); the operation meet ⊓ corresponds to the interception ran(P α ) ∩ ran(P β ); the operation join ⊔ corresponds to the smallest closed subspace of H containing the union ran(P α )∪ran(P β ). The lattice L(H) is bounded, i.e., it has the greatest element ran(1) = H and the least element ran(0) = {0} that satisfy the following subset relation for every ran(P ) in L(H):
LetP α ⊓P β ,P α ⊔P β andP α +P β denote projections on the interception ran(P α ) ∩ ran(P β ), the union ran(P α ) ∪ ran(P β ) and the sum ran(P α ) + ran(P β ), respectively. One can write then
ran(P α +P β ) = ran(P α ) + ran(P β ) .
Clearly, if the column spaces ran(P α ) and ran(P β ) are orthogonal, their union coincides with their sum, i.e.,
On the other hand, if the projection operatorsP α andP β on H are orthogonal, thenP αPβ = P βPα =0. Hence, in this case one must get
Now, consider the truth-value assignments of the projection operators in the lattice L(H).
Let v be the truth-value assignment function andP ⋄ denote the projection operator associated with the proposition ⋄. Assume that the following valuational axiom holds:
Suppose that a system is in a pure state |Ψ α lying in the column space of the projection operatorP α . Since being in ran(P α ) meansP α |Ψ α = 1 · |Ψ α , one can assume that in the state |Ψ α ∈ ran(P α ), the truth-value assignment function v assigns the truth value 1 to the operatorP α and, in this way, the proposition α, specifically,
, then one can assume that the system is in the state |Ψ α ∈ ran(P α ). These two assumptions can be written down together as the logical biconditional, namely,
On the other hand, the vector |Ψ α must lie in the null space of any projection operatorP β orthogonal toP α . Since being in ker(P β ) meansP β |Ψ α = 0 · |Ψ α , one can assume then that
Suppose by contrast that the system is in the pure state |Ψ that does not lie in the column or null space of the projection operatorP ⋄ , i.e., |Ψ / ∈ ran(P ⋄ ) and |Ψ / ∈ ker(P ⋄ ). Under the valuation assumptions (18) and (19), the truth-value function v must assign neither 1 nor 0 toP ⋄ , namely, v(P ⋄ ) = 1 and v(P ⋄ ) = 0. Hence, in this case the proposition ⋄ associated withP ⋄ cannot be bivalent, namely, [
Using a supervaluationary semantics (see, for example [2] or [3] ), this failure of bivalence can be described as a truth-value gap for the proposition ⋄, explicitly,
Within the said semantics, the operators1 and0 can be equated with "the super-truth" and "the super-falsity" since under the valuations (18) and (19) these operators are true and false, respectively, in any arbitrary state |Φ in the Hilbert space H, that is,
In this way, the approach based on the assumption (20) results in a "gappy" logic with the propositions giving rise to truth-value gaps. Accordingly, one can call this approach quantum supervaluationism (for other details of the approach see [4] ).
Logic EPR account
The entangled particles A and B can be represented by observables σ 
whereP ↑↓ z andP ↓↑ z denote the orthogonal projection operators defined aŝ
On the other hand, the singlet state |0, 0 z is the vector
where
and so
As follows, the vector |0, 0 z lies in the column space of the sum of two projection operatorsP
One can conclude from here that the projection operatorP Diff z associated with the proposition Diff z can be presented as the sum:P
Likewise, one can get
whereP 
and
in whicĥ
Consequently, one gets
where C ∈ C. Under the supervaluationist postulation (20), this brings the following valuations in the singlet state |0, 0 j :
As follows, even though the proposition Diff j has the preexisting value of truth in the state |0, 0 j , the statement "m 
Conclusion remarks
As the expression (9) demonstrates, it is counter-factual definiteness that, together with the principle of truth-functionality, led to the bivaluation of the statement "m Then again, from the point of view of the logical matrix which fixes a model of logic [5] , counterfactual definiteness can be interpreted as the assertion that the experimentally testable propositions -like -possess intrinsic truth values that exist even when these propositions have not been verified (see to that end the definition of counter-factual definiteness in [6, 7, 8] ).
This suggests that to permit realist interpretations of quantum mechanics (whose characteristical details can be found, e.g., in papers [9, 10] ), models of logic underpinning such interpretations must reject preexisting truth-values in general -as the described in this paper quantum supervaluationist EPR account does.
